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a b s t r a c t
Inmultiagent systems, agents often face binary decisionswhere one seeks to take either the
minority or the majority side. Examples are minority and congestion games in general, i.e.,
situations that require coordination among the agents in order to depict efficient decisions.
Inminority games such as the El Farol Bar Problem, previousworks have shown that agents
may reach appropriate levels of coordination, mostly by looking at the history of past deci-
sions. Notmanyworks consider any kind of structure of the social network, i.e., how agents
are connected. Moreover, when structure is indeed considered, it assumes some kind of
random network with a given, fixed connectivity degree. The present paper departs from
the conventional approach in some ways. First, it considers more realistic network topolo-
gies, based on preferential attachments. This is especially useful in social networks. Second,
the formalism of random Boolean networks is used to help agents to make decisions given
their attachments (for example acquaintances). This is coupledwith a reinforcement learn-
ingmechanism that allows agents to select strategies that are locally and globally efficient.
Third, we use agent-basedmodeling and simulation, amicroscopic approach, which allows
us to draw conclusions about individuals and/or classes of individuals. Finally, for the sake
of illustration we use two different scenarios, namely the El Farol Bar Problem and a bi-
nary route choice scenario. With this approach we target systems that adapt dynamically
to changes in the environment, including other adaptive decision-makers. Our results using
preferential attachments and random Boolean networks are threefold. First we show that
an efficient equilibrium can be achieved, provided agents do experimentation. Second, mi-
croscopic analysis show that influential agents tend to consider few inputs in their Boolean
functions. Third, we have also conducted measurements related to network clustering and
centrality that help to see how agents are organized.
© 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
One of the major research directions in adaptive and self-organizing systems is dedicated to learning how to coordinate
decisions and actions of multiple agents. Also, it is important to understand whether individual agents’ decisions can lead
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to globally optimal or at least acceptable solutions. Our long term research aims at studying the effect of several types of
strategies for self-organization of agents in complex systems. The present paper addresses simulation of agents’ decision-
making regarding a well-known problem in collectives in general [1] and in minority games in particular.
We use two distinct scenarios. The first is the El Farol Bar Problem (EFBP), proposed by B. Arthur [2], which has also been
the subject of, e.g., Refs. [3,4]. The idea behind this metaphor is that a common situation people face is when one has gone
to his/her favorite pub only to find out that it happened to be overcrowded that night, leading to one regretting not to have
stayed home.
The metaphor of rewarding the decision that is made by the minority of the players (or agents) is interesting in many
scenarios. For instance, in agent-based simulation of traffic, a minority game is clearly useful to model route choice. This
leads us to the second scenario, which deals exactly with iterated route choice (IRC) in vehicular traffic networks.
Minority games have been the focus of many works. Regarding the general idea, the most similar works to the present
paper have appeared in Ref. [5] and in Ref. [6]. In all these cases, the authors have also considered agents in a kind of social
network. However, the connectivity was such that the average number of neighbors with whom each agent interacts was
fixed. In the present paper we use a topology with preferential attachment in the sense of Barabási and Albert [7], which
basically means that a few nodes have big connectivity while the majority of the nodes are connected to just another node.
Also, we go beyond classical minority games such as the EFBP – where the reward is binary – and propose that the use of
the RBN formalism can model a wider class of games. Here we discuss the two applications previously mentioned.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: The next two sections review someworks on the EFBP and its more general
version, the minority game (Section 2), and explain how the RBN formalism works (Section 3). Following these, in Section 4
our methods are presented. Simulation results and their analysis then follow. Finally, Section 6 discusses several aspects of
this work and its future directions, and provides concluding remarks.
2. Related work on minority games, and route choice
Microeconomics and game-theory assumehumanbehavior to be rational anddeductive—deriving a conclusion byperfect
logical processes fromwell-defined premises. But this assumption does not hold especially in interactive situations like the
coordination of many agents. There is no a priori best strategy since the outcome of a game depends on other players.
Therefore, bounded and inductive rationality (i.e., making a decision based on past experience) is supposed to be a more
realistic description.
In this context, in 1994, B. Arthur introduced a coordination game called the El Farol Bar Problem. Every week n players
wish to visit the bar El Farol. Up to a certain threshold ρ of customers the bar is very comfortable and enjoyable. If it is too
crowed, it is better to stay home. The payoff of the game is clear: if the number of visitors is less than the threshold ρ, these
visitors are rewarded, otherwise those who stayed home are better off. In the original work, n = 100 and ρ = 60were used,
but arbitrary values of n and ρ have also been studied, as e.g., in Ref. [4].
The players can only make predictions about the attendance for the next time based on the results of the previous m
weeks. For the decision whether to go or to stay home, the player always selects the strategy that predicts the outcome of
the last weeks most accurately. Computer simulations have shown that the mean attendance converges to the threshold
ρ = 60.
Later, the EFBP was generalized to a binary game by Challet and Zhang [3], the so-called Minority Game (MG). An odd
number n of players has to choose between two alternatives (e.g., yes or no, or simply 0 or 1). With a memory sizem there
are 22
m
possible strategies. Each player has a set S of them. These are chosen randomly out of the whole set. In the simplest
version of the game, players are rewarded one point if they are in theminority group. Other functions that favor, for instance,
smaller minorities were studied by several authors as, e.g., Refs. [8,4].
The MG and the EFBP are gradually becoming a paradigm for complex systems and have been recently studied in detail.
We will refer briefly to some of the results.
In their original work, Challet and Zhang [3] have systematically studied the influence of thememory sizem and number
of strategies S on the performance of the game.
B. Edmonds [9] has investigated the emergence of heterogeneity among agents in a simulation. His paper tackles
evolutionary learning as well as communication among agents, which might lead to a differentiation of roles at the end
of the run.
Still regarding the EFBP, the most similar work to the present paper has appeared in Ref. [5]. However, the focus there
is resource allocation: agents using particular resources are rewarded or punished according to the availability of these
resources. Also, agents use a set of strategies to decide which resource to choose, and use a simple reinforcement learning
scheme to update the accuracy of strategies. A strategy is a lookup table that suggests to an agent what resource to choose
based on the actions of its neighbors at the previous time step. This way, these authors have also considered agents in a kind
of social network. However the connectivity is such that the average number of neighbors with whom each agent interacts
is fixed. In the present paper we use a topology with preferential attachment [7], which basically means that a few nodes
have big connectivity while the majority of the nodes are connected to just another node.
In more general terms, there has been an interesting line of research connecting minority games and collective
intelligence such as Ref. [10]. For a discussion see Ref. [1].
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Fig. 1. N = 3 connected agents (K = 2) in an RBN.
Table 1
Boolean functions for agents C , A and B.
(AND) (OR) (OR)
A B C = (A∧B) B C A = (B∨C) A C B = (A∨C)
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1
1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Regarding the use of the minority game in urban traffic, some publications suggest the application of this metaphor
in modeling processes such as route and mode choice. This is particularly relevant in environments where the decision
is coupled with other agents’ decisions, as it is the case of route choice. In this modeling approach it is usual to consider
abstract scenarios such as a binary route choice, inspired by congestion or minority games. The basic idea is that agents
have to decide simultaneously between two routes; those that select the less crowded one receive a higher reward. Agents’
repeated decision-making is coupled to some adaptation or learning strategy so that the next choice is adapted to the reward
feedback. Based on this, an equilibrium may be reached.
Examples of such abstract two-route scenarios can be found in Ref. [11], inwhich a reinforcement learning scheme is used
that aims at reproducing the decision-making of human subjects in a corresponding experimental study [12]. Before this, a
similar scenario had appeared in Refs. [13,14], where a second phase in decision-making is included after agents receive a
forecast of travel time. In these game-theoretic scenarios, the reward of agents selecting a route is calculated based on the
total number of agents that selected that route. In these three works, the problem is so formulated that the equilibrium is
reached when two-thirds of the drivers select one route.
Finally, authors in Ref. [15] investigate the use of minority games to achieve a balanced usage of a road network in which
decisions are made about which link to follow.
3. Random Boolean networks
Boolean networks have been used to explain self-organization and adaptation in complex systems. The study of the
behavior of regulatory systems by means of networks of Boolean functions was introduced by Kauffman in 1969 [16].
Examples of the use of this approach in biology, genomics, and other complex systems can be found in Ref. [17].
RBN’s are made up of binary variables. In the settings investigated here, a network is composed of N agents that must
decide which binary action to make. Each agent is represented by one of these binary variables. These in turn are, each,
regulated by some other variables, which serve as inputs. The dynamical behavior of each agent, namely which action it will
execute at the next time step, is governed by a logical rule based on a Boolean function. These functions specify, for each
possible combination of K input values, the status of the regulated variable. Thus, being K the number of input variables
regulating a given agent, since each of these inputs can be either on or off (1 or 0), the number of combinations of states
of the K inputs is 2K . For each of these combinations, a specific Boolean function must output either 1 or 0, thus the total
number of Boolean functions over K inputs is 22
K
. When K = 2, some of these functions are well-known (AND, OR, XOR,
NAND, etc.) but in general there is no obvious semantics.
To illustrate the regulation process, Fig. 1 depicts a simple example of a network ofN = 3 agentswhere eachwas assigned
a Boolean function randomly, and K = 2. The Boolean functions for these 3 agents are then depicted in Table 1 (adapted
from Ref. [17]): agents A and B are regulated by function OR, while agent C is regulated by an AND. In this table, one can see
all possibilities for C (3rd column) to make a decision. Similarly, A’s output is determined by the inputs from both B and C ,
and B’s output depends on inputs from A and C .
Given the three Boolean function from Tables 1 and 2 shows, for all 23 states at a given time T , the action taken by
each agent at time T + 1, i.e., the successor state of each state. Further, from this table, it is possible to determine the state
transition graph of the network, which appears in Fig. 2. One sees that there are 3 state cycles.
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Table 2
States’ transition for Table 1.
(T ) (T + 1)
A B C A B C
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 1 0
0 1 0 1 0 0
0 1 1 1 1 0
1 0 0 0 1 0
1 0 1 1 1 0
1 1 0 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
Table 3
Mutated version of Table 1.
(NAND) (OR) (OR)
A B C = ¬(A∧B) B C A = (B∨C) A C B = (A∨C)
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1
1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1
1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Fig. 2. States’ transition graph for Table 1 (3 state cycles and attractors).
Fig. 3. States’ transition graph for Table 3 (single state cycle and attractor).
If we randomly assign one of the 22
K
Boolean functions to each of the N agents, the dynamics is deterministic and the
system ends up in one of the state cycles. It is then a matter of chance that only a certain number ρ of agents end up in the
minority. For instance in the case depicted in Fig. 2, in both cycles 1 (000) and 3 (111), either none (state 1) or all (state 3)
select a given action.
However, if the network depicted in Fig. 1 suffers some perturbation or mutation (as part of some evolutionary process),
then the systemmay escape a bad attractor (which, in the context of minority games, is a state in which either too many or
too few agents make a given action). This evolution of the network may happen in several ways: agents get reconnected to
others, the Boolean functions change, etc..
Let us consider an example in which the Boolean function of agent C changes from AND to NAND. Functions are now
depicted in Table 3 while Table 4 shows the successor state of each state and Fig. 3 depicts the state transition graph. The
dynamics of the regulation changes as seen in Fig. 3. Now only one state or attractor exists (110), namely one that has the
property that agents A and B are always in the majority while agent C is in the minority.
The extent of such a change –whether or not the systemwill be attracted to another attraction basin – obviously depends
on the extent of the changes in the network and/or functions. In [17] the author extensively discusses many of these factors,
as well as the properties of RBN’s, including the issue of stability and cycle length. In the present paper, because the logic of
the functions and the structure of the network changes along time, properties such as periodic behavior cannot be observed.
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Table 4
States’ transition for Table 3.
(T ) (T + 1)
A B C A B C
0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 1 1 1 1
0 1 0 1 0 1
0 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 0 0 1 1
1 0 1 1 1 1
1 1 0 1 1 0
1 1 1 1 1 0
On the other hand, a central question raised by Kauffman, and which is relevant to our work, relates to the problem of
adaptation in a system with many interacting parts. The key question is whether an adaptive process which is constrained
to altering the input connections between elements in a network and the logic governing them can hill climb to networks
with desired attractors.
4. Methods
As mentioned, in the present paper we use RBN’s to equip the agents with a decision-making framework. This is
appropriate for binary (i.e., Boolean) decision-making, which aim at considering inputs from other agents in this decision-
making process. To do so, in the EFBP for instance, we replace the space of possible strategies described in Ref. [2] by a set
(one per node) of Boolean functions. This alsomeans that each node is connected to a given number of others. Hence, instead
of having a random strategy, each node has random Boolean functions and uses them to determinate whether or not to go
to the bar. Contrarily to the work in Ref. [2] (andmany others that have followed), we consider that the agents are organized
in a kind of social network.
Similarly, in the route choice (IRC) scenario, instead of using a probabilistic approach to select a route (as in Ref. [13]),
each driver agent explores a set of functions and a set of connections to other agents in order to make the route decision.
We now describe the details of the approach, whose scheme appears in Algorithm 1. Each agent i ∈ N is a node in a
random Boolean network and is connected to a given number of others. Contrarily to previous works, this number is not
fixed and/or homogeneous. Therefore K (number of acquaintances and consequently the number of entries in the Boolean
functions) is not a parameter that has a constant value as in other approaches. Rather each node may have its own Ki.
The topology of this social network is set according to a preferential attachment algorithm. We have used both the
algorithm proposed in Ref. [7], as well as a slight modification on it, which is intended to prevent degrees related to K being
too high. Results shown later in Section 5 refer to the latter but we also discuss what happens if the standard algorithm is
used. The reason for preventing the increase in K is that it is clear that when K is high, the RBN behaves in essence randomly
given that the space of possible outputs is 22
K
.
We remark that when the word degree may refer here to both the number of incoming links to a node, as well as the
number of outgoing links from a node. This is especially important in the case we describe later, when the outgoing degrees
will be allowed to change as nodes decide to break some connections and replace them for others. Thus when we use K we
mean incoming degree, i.e., the number of input links to a node.
Another parameter of the model is the number of functions each node possesses, |F |. We remark that |F | cannot be as
large as 22
K
when K is much larger than 2. This is so because the agent being bounded rational, it can only know a small
fraction of the possible functions. Of course, at each time step only one of these functions is used thus the node needs to have
a mechanism to decide which one brings more utility at local level. However, given the nature of minority games, the utility
is highly coupled with the efficiency at system level. Efficiency is a domain-dependent concept related to the equilibrium of
the particular system. In the EFBP the equilibrium calls for the bar accommodating ρ agents (in the original work ρ = 60%).
In the IRC, the equilibrium is such that route M carries ρ = 23 of the traffic (as in Ref. [12]). Of course, one cannot be sure
that a function that works well for an agent i = 1 will also work well for another agent i = 2. That is because the outcome
of a function depends on its inputs (in this case, the agent’s acquaintances).
Our approach for adaptation of the functions that are used at local level is based on an ε-greedy exploration process. At
time step t = 0 one function from the set of |Fi| possible functions is assigned to each agent i. Then, at each further time
step, the node decides to change the current functionwith probability ϕ. Because ϕ < 1, it is not the case that agents change
functions synchronously. When a change in function occurs, a new one is selected based on the utility it has provided so
far. With probability 1 − ε, the node chooses the function that has yielded the highest reward so far. Otherwise it picks a
function randomly. In the beginning of the simulation ε = 1 to allow exploration, but every time a function is changed, the
value of ε is multiplied by δ < 1. The rewards are domain-dependent so we defer this discussion for a while.
At each time step each agent uses a function fi ∈ F . According to it and also to the value of the Ki entries, either 0 or 1
is output. It must be noticed that the inputs are the actions of the K neighbors in the last time step (in the initial time step,
all agents start with a random action). In the EFBP scenario we assume that if a Boolean function returns 0, this means the
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Algorithm 1Main simulation procedure
1: set or initialize parameters: N (set of agents), |F | (cardinality of the set of Boolean functions each agent has), ϕ
(probability of changing Boolean function), ε (probability of selecting a function randomly instead of greedily), δ
(decrease rate of ε), t = 0
2: {//create agents:}
3: create topology based on the preferential attachment algorithm
4: for all i ∈ N do
5: create list Gi containing the Ki neighbors of i
6: draw one function randomly (uniform) from Fi and assign to fi
7: end for
8: {//execute until end of simulation:}
9: while t ≤ tmax do
10: for all i ∈ N do
11: decide which Boolean action to make based on fi and the Ki entries from Gi
12: end for
13: collect all action selections
14: for all i ∈ N do
15: update reward rfi of function fi (domain dependent; see equations Eq. (2) for IRC and Eq. (1) for EFBP)
16: decide whether or not to change function with probability ϕ
17: if change function then
18: select a new function greedily (based on reward) or randomly, with probability ε and 1− ε respectively
19: assign new function to i
20: ε = ε × δ
21: if variant CW then
22: break link with node j− (worst acquaintance of i) and create link with node j+ (best friend among all friends of
i)
23: end if
24: end if
25: end for
26: increment t
27: end while
agent stays at home; when the function returns 1 the decision is to go to the bar. In the route choice scenario 0 and 1 mean
the agent selects routeM or its alternative respectively.
So far we have introduced the basic procedures, where each node has fixed connections, i.e., the set of Ki acquaintances
does not change with time. Next, a variant called change worst (CW) is described.
The CW variant assumes that the network of acquaintances will change over time. CW is more utilitarian than the basic
variant, but also more realistic, in the sense that now agents evaluate the quality of their acquaintances. In the real-world, if
someone is not performing well in the game, it will be likely to be labeled a black sheep and will be less and less considered
as a part of a group. This assumes a certain level of communication among the agents, which is perfectly reasonable given
that it is restricted to the small group of acquaintances. Thus, in this variant, each agent i looks at the reward rj of each agent
j ∈ Gi and finds the agent with the worst reward. Reward here means accumulated reward. Let j− be this agent. Agent i then
marks j− as a candidate for replacement, meaning that if i finds a better friend, it will no longer consider the action of j−
when deciding its own action. This check is performed simultaneously with the change of function, mainly to avoid having
another parameter in the model. Again, the motivation for modeling that kind of behavior is that j− is prematurely labeled
as a black sheep and hence prone to be unconsidered, even if j−’s bad reward may not be directly related to i’s performance.
To replace j−, iwill look for a better connection among the best friends (again, in terms of reward) of its friends. The idea
here is that iwants to be connected with a person with a good performance. Let j+ be this agent. j+’s determination is based
on the rewards of the friends of i’s friends. More specifically, this means that i asks all its friends about the reward of their
friends. Knowing these rewards, i compares the performance of j+ in relation to j− and, if the former is higher, i replaces the
connection it had to j− by a connection to j+. Again, this does not affect j+ since the relationship is not bidirectional; imay
find j+ is worth considering in its input set without j+ even noticing this.
After eventually including j+ to its social network, iwill consider j+ as an input in its RBN (in the place of j−) and hence
the input degree Ki of i remains the same. j− however becomes less popular while j+ increases its popularity and influence.
Reward computation in the EFBP
In the EFBP scenario, the decision of each agent is considered the right one if it decides to go to the bar and less than ρ%
of all agents have made the same decision. Similarly, the decision is also considered correct if the agent has decided to stay
home and ρ% or more of all agents have decided to go to the bar. The decision is considered wrong otherwise. This is shown
in Eq. (1) for each iwhen using function fi.
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This way, at each time step the quality of fi will be measured and its reward rfi will be updated. Also, the accumulated
reward of function fi is updated each time it is used, and computed as Rfi =

t rfi i.e., it considers only the rewards obtained
when a given function fi was used.
rfi =

rfi + 1 if i in minority
rfi − 1 otherwise. (1)
Iterated route choice: description and reward computation
Basically, the abstract scenario used in Refs. [14,11] (and that we also use here) can be seen as an special instance of
the minority game: N agents repeatedly have to decide between two alternative routes M and S. Let us assume that one
alternative, namelyM (main) is preferred (e.g., it providesmore capacity). After each route choice, every agent gets a reward
that is computed based on the number of agents who selected the same alternative. This mimics the actual travel time
experienced by the agent itself.
In this simple model of adaptive choice, the reward computation for each agent i at time t and using fi is computed as
in Eq. (2). The parameters nM and nS represent the number of agents selectingM and S respectively. B is a balancing factor
to prevent negative rewards; thus it changes with N . This formula was used in Ref. [12] for studying the decision making
process in route decision experiments with N = 18 human subjects. In this case, the balance is achieved by setting B to
30. In the equilibrium, 2N3 = 12 drivers should select M and 6 should select S, with both getting the reward of 10 units. In
Ref. [14] this was extended to a simulated experiment considering N = 900; B = 2100 was used so that the reward of the
balanced situation is 1300 units, which is the outcome of Eq. (2) when nM = 600 and nS = 300.
rfi =

rM = 4× B3 −

(nM + ns)
3
+ (2× nM)

if i selectsM
rS = 4× B3 −

2× (nM + nS)
3
+ (3× nS)

if i selects S.
(2)
Similarly to the EFBP scenario, Rfi is the reward agent i has accumulated (up to step t) when using fi.
5. Experiments and analysis of the results
5.1. Settings
The parameters previously mentioned in Section 4 take the following values. The horizon of simulation is tmax = 1000
time steps. The simulations were repeated 30 times for each configuration.
N = 900 in both scenarios as we have kept the number of agents from the previous experimental setting of Ref. [14].
The number of Boolean functions known by each agent is at most |F | = 10. We have tested the following values for
ϕ and δ: ϕ ∈ {0.1, 0.2, 0.9} and δ ∈ {0.999, 0.99, 0.9}. These values for δ were chosen because they allow us to study
those cases when ε decreases at different rates. This of course has an effect on how often agents explore different Boolean
functions before exploiting.
In the case of the EFBP the main metric to be analyzed is the amount of agents that go to the bar (as in Ref. [2]). The
objective is to verify whether the use of RBN’s in the EFBP also leads to an emerging behavior and, if so, what is the outcome.
We thus compare our results with the ones from Ref. [2]. To do so we use ρ = 60%.
In the IRC, forN = 900 agents, the reward function is balanced in away that an equilibrium for the distribution of reward
occurs when 600 agents selectM and 300 S. Thus, in this case, B = 2100.
In the CW variant, we have also performed microscopic analysis about how the topology of the network changes. We do
this aiming at understanding the role of degree in the reward of the agents, aswell as the degree distribution in the efficiency
of the whole system. These results appear in Section 5.3.
As mentioned, one important feature of the present work is the fact that agents are arranged in a more realistic network,
generated bymeans of a preferential attachment algorithm. Fig. 4 shows the distribution of input degree (K ), i.e., howmany
nodes (y axis) have which K (x axis). This particular plot refers to the EFBP but we notice that the IRC has a very similar
pattern. We stress that this distribution does not change with time because even when agents are allowed to change their
acquaintances (CW variant), they simply exchange them, thus keeping Ki constant.
5.2. Results: macroscopic analysis
Before discussing the results, we remark that if Boolean functions are assigned randomly to the agents and do not change
along time, it is expected that 50% of the agents select one of the two available actions, i.e., in the EFBP 50% go to the bar, and
in the IRC 50% select routeM . This is of course not efficient in either case because, in the EFBP the target threshold is ρ = 60%
of the agents going to the bar. Similarly, in the IRC, the maximum efficiency of the system is reached when two-thirds of the
agents use routeM .
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Fig. 4. Distribution of nodes (N) with given degree K .
Fig. 5. FR: bar attendance for δ = 0.9.
We start discussing the case in which the topology is set at the beginning of the simulation and does not change (FR
variant) in Section 5.2.1. As shown next, in both the EFBP and the IRC the system efficiency is reached (the time taken
depends on values of the parameters, especially ϕ). However this is not realistic as people do change their connections
because although the system as a whole performs good, some individuals do not. Following this discussion, we then present
the results obtained when the topology does change (Section 5.2.2, variant CW).
5.2.1. FR: topology remains fixed
As we can see in Fig. 5, convergence of the system to average attendance of ρ = 60% is achieved. The time taken for this
convergence of course strongly depends on the values ofϕ (the probability of changing function) and δ (how fast ε decreases).
When δ decreases fast, the convergence is achieved earlier. Due to lack of space we do not show plots for different values
of δ but remark that, among the values tested, δ = 0.9 seems the best value because the agents do not need to have longer
experimentation periods (as would be the case with δ = 0.999). The reason for this fast convergence is that the majority of
the agents have low K (see Fig. 4) and hence not so many functions to try.
The role of the parameter ϕ is more significant; different values of ϕ have different effects in both the EFBP and the
IRC scenarios. Fig. 5 shows the bar’s attendance for δ = 0.9 and different values ofϕ. Aswe can see the attendance converges
very fast to ρ = 60% when ϕ = 0.9.
Regarding the IRC scenario (Fig. 6), we note a similar pattern of convergence of the system as a whole to the equilibrium
(two-thirds of the drivers selecting route M). However, compared to the EFBP, the convergence is much faster if a lower
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Fig. 6. FR: choice of routeM for δ = 0.9.
Fig. 7. CW: bar attendance for δ = 0.9.
value of ϕ is used. The reason for this difference is that the reward function in the IRC is more complex meaning the agent
needs to probe each Boolean function for a longer time. Therefore, changing functions too frequently (which iswhat happens
when ϕ is above 0.1) is not a good policy.
5.2.2. CW: topology changes along time
Wenowdiscuss what happens in amore realistic situation, namely the agents exchange their worst performing acquain-
tance for some good performing one, selected among the friends of its friends.
Fig. 7 shows such a plot, here for the EFBP (IRC is similar), for δ = 0.9, for changing values of ϕ. We remark that ϕ is also
used to do the exchange of acquaintances.
Comparing Fig. 5 with Fig. 7 it is possible to see that the convergence to ρ = 60% for ϕ = 0.9 now takes more time, due
to the fact that not only functions change in the CW case but also the connections. It thus remains to be investigated what
happens if only acquaintances are changed, keeping functions constant or, alternatively, if functions change at a slower pace.
5.3. Results: microscopic analysis
The results presented in the previous sections are interesting as they confirm the convergence to the system equilibrium,
which is obtained by the agents adapting at individual level. However they say close to nothing about individual
performances or at least about the performance of classes of agents. We now discuss what happens with agents that have
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Table 5
EFBP: microscopic analysis along time (ϕ = 0.9).
t Most influential Former most influential Nb. of clusters Biggest cluster
Node Value out degree K Node Value out degree
1 6 12 9 – – 14 374
2 35 15 2 6 12 20 302
3 171 21 3 35 16 24 205
4 627 33 2 171 26 25 302
5 178 45 4 627 22 27 191
6 178 49 4 178 49 30 187
7 178 51 4 178 51 31 127
8 178 51 4 178 51 32 127
9 178 51 4 178 51 33 127
10 184 66 1 178 51 33 127
· · ·
1000 872 68 1 – – 35 107
Table 6
IRC: microscopic analysis along time (ϕ = 0.1).
t Most influential Nb. of clusters Biggest cluster
Node Value of out degree K
1 816 12 15 1 900
5 159 12 7 2 897
6 816 12 15 3 871
7 816 13 15 3 871
10 848 13 4 8 782
11 112 13 1 8 782
13 103 15 1 10 718
15 290 20 2 12 609
20 103 25 1 12 609
30 266 44 1 16 183
40 266 65 1 21 163
70 266 79 1 22 163
· · ·
1000 760 79 1 22 163
different levels of influence (i.e., outgoing degree) as well as different rewards. Since such kind of analysis cannot be done
over an average of several repetitions (because the degree of a node varies greatly as it is randomly assigned at the beginning
of the simulation), the discussion refers to two arbitrarily chosen simulation run (one for each scenario).
We start with the EFBP considering one simulation with δ = 0.9 and ϕ = 0.9. In this simulation, the most influenced
node, i.e., the one that has the maximum incoming degree has Ki = 13. This however is not the main aspect of our
investigation since the highest K does not change along time. Thus we concentrate the discussion on the outgoing degree,
i.e., how some nodes influence others, as well as on some network centrality measures.
Tables 5 and 6 refer to the EFBP and IRC respectively. They show, for the initial time steps as well as for the last one, the
following information: name of the node (2nd column); its outgoing and Ki degrees (3rd and 4th columns); which outgoing
degree this node had in the previous time step (to permit an evaluation of how this changes, 6th column); howmany clusters
there are, and the size of the biggest cluster. A cluster is a graph component such that its nodes are connected to other nodes
within the same component, i.e., these nodes share no edge with nodes outside the cluster.
In the EFBP (Table 5), at the beginning of the simulation, node 6 is the most influential node, influencing 12 others. Note
that node 6 has Ki = 9. This node then remains with outgoing degree 12 in step 2. However the most influential node in
step 2 is now node 35 (influencing 15 others). As time passes, one notes the increase in outgoing degrees, caused by the fact
that many nodes want to be attached to good performing ones. It is no coincidence that the K of the most influential node
(in each time step) decreases. Nodes with high K have a lot of lines in their Boolean tables (2K ) and are therefore, ‘‘complex’’
nodes. If K is higher than 3 or 4, the behavior can be considered basically random, at least in the time frame considered.
At step 10 of the simulation, node 184 has turned very popular. It influences 66 other nodes (in the previous step, not
shown in the table, it influenced just 39). We do not include the centrality measures in the table but notice that we have
investigated closeness and betweenness for each node at each time step. For instance, node 184 has, at step 10, the highest
closeness (value 0.00120192). This value is the average hops required to reach all other nodes from node 184. From this
step on the connections do not change much so that at step 1000, the most influential node is 872 (degree 68, closeness
0.001201923).
It is also interesting to check what happens with the number of clusters in the graph, as well as their sizes. This depends
mainly based on two factors. The first is the random nature of the initial connecting process, i.e., how initial connections
are established between the nodes. Thus, this factor determines the initial number of clusters. The second relates to the
parameter ϕ, since this parameter determines how frequently a change of Boolean function happens and ultimately, how
D. Epstein, A.L.C. Bazzan / Physica A 392 (2013) 5387–5398 5397
good a node performs, which then determines how many connections it has. Thus ϕ determines how fast cluster sizes
change. As a general rule, the higher the ϕ, the faster some nodes may find a good Boolean function, which improves their
performance and attracts other nodes, forming more clusters.
We show here two examples. The first (shown in Table 5) refers to a situation with initially many clusters and ϕ = 0.9.
For the results given in Table 6, it can be seen that there is only one cluster containing all nodes; there, ϕ = 0.1.
Regarding Table 5, the random process at the beginning of this particular simulation run has generated 14 clusters. The
biggest cluster included 374 of the 900 nodes. As time proceeds, there is a tendency of some nodes finding a good Boolean
function, thus attracting other nodes. Also, some nodes break with their bad input connections, increasing the number of
clusters, as bad performing nodes get more and more disconnected. The only thing they can do is to change their worst
acquaintance as well.
Table 6 shows a similar evolution of the size of the outgoing degree, this time, as mentioned, for a random selected run of
the IRC case with δ = 0.9 and ϕ = 0.1. Here, because the convergence to the stable situation takes longer than for the EFBP,
we do not show step by step but rather only steps in which either the most influential node has changed or, if not changed,
had its value changed greatly.
As mentioned, in the beginning, there is just a single cluster that includes all nodes. As in the EFBP, as time passes, we
note an increase in the number of clusters and a decrease in the size of the biggest cluster.
Regarding the outgoing degree, at the beginning of the simulation, node 816 influences 12 others. At time step 5 it is the
node 159which turns themost influential, although node 816 returns to this position at step 6, even increasing its influence
to 13 at step 7. From this on, other nodes turn more influential so that, e.g., by step 70 node 266 influences 79 other nodes.
The situation stabilizes and by the end of the simulation, node 760 influences 79 other nodes.
The conclusion of the microscopic analysis is that more influential nodes tend to be simple (low K ), probably because
they are more foreseeable, thus making the adaptation to them (by the neighbors) easier.
6. Conclusion and future work
Minority games have been used as metaphors to study adaptation of agents that have to act in a coordinated way in
collectives. Depending on the setting, agents have a different way of using a set of individual strategies to select an action.
These strategies are normally based on the complete knowledge about the attendance at the previous m weeks. Instead of
assuming this knowledge, in the present paper we assume that agents interact in a social network. In particular, differently
from previous works, the connectivity degree K is not homogeneous. Rather, agents are connected based on preferential
attachment. We then let each agent i decide which action to do based on a Boolean function that maps the inputs of Ki
acquaintances to i’s output. Our approach admits some variants that were tested, as for instance whether or not to exchange
acquaintances.
We have applied these ideas in two scenarios that differ greatly in the way the reward function is structured. We have
found that using the RBN formalism (instead of memory-based methods), each agent is able to select an action that brings
the system to the equilibrium, thus achieving the implicit coordination already observed by other authors.
Moreover, we are able to study microscopic properties such as how the influences change within time. The main finding
is that more influential nodes tend to be simpler, i.e., have few inputs only.
In a future work we want to focus on the microscopic analysis regarding the rewards obtained, in the same way that
we have analyzed the evolution of the influences in the network. We also plan to make more detailed analysis by different
classes of values of K and also investigate the effect of changing the number of Boolean functions each agent knows, as for
instance having this number change according to K .
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